Bruno Meessen (ITM, Antwerp) and Olivier Basenya (MoH, Burundi) report on a donor meeting hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway dedicated to developing a road map for results-based financing (Oslo 11-12 December).

The countdown has begun: there are only 750 days left till the MDG deadline. On the side of donors and agencies, the ticking clock is only increasing the eagerness to accelerate progress. Politically speaking, this timeframe is indeed important in the North, especially in countries like Norway or the UK, where several political leaders have used much of their political capital to lobby for global health at national and international level. Against this backdrop, the PBF CoP facilitation team is fully aware that it also needs to attend donor meetings to explain, bring evidence and share experiences about Performance Based Financing. We were therefore happy to make the trip to Oslo to discuss with donors and aid agencies a road map for the scaling up of RBF(1).

The meeting was opened by Anthony Lake, the executive director of UNICEF, a strong indication that UNICEF is joining the club of agencies committed to integrating RBF in their policy toolbox. The first half-day of the meeting was dedicated to reporting on Results-Based Financing (RBF) progress. We heard about experiences in Tanzania, Zambia and Argentina – all of them belonging to the category of PBF schemes, which focus on barriers on the supply side (2). Olivier Basenya also presented the experience of Burundi. If you are involved in PBF projects, you probably won’t be surprised to learn that PBF is boosting indicators of key health services, especially those aligned with the MDGs, while also leveraging the whole system (in terms of work culture, accountability…).

On the second half-day, we first listened to aid agencies dwelling on recent developments on their part; some of these developments seem very favorable to RBF. For instance, we learned that the Global Fund has realized that their system of granting funding through ‘rounds’ created incentives for countries to avoid risks and in many cases led to proposals with very vertical approaches. The Global Fund will now adopt a more ‘health systems’-style approach, or at least to a greater extent than before. In the future, countries will be expected to organize a country dialogue going beyond the CCM (Country Coordination Mechanism). The new grant system of the Global Fund will also be much more supportive to strategies like PBF, which is seen as a great platform for integrating health service delivery at country level. Prospects seem also good on the side of the GAVI initiative. During the discussion about collaboration between agencies, the case of Benin was of course mentioned, as it is a country where PBF is being co-developed by the World Bank, GAVI and the Global Fund.

We then listened to donors’ (USA, Germany, Sweden, Japan, the UK and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) own stance on RBF. All of them are positive about RBF, even if their involvement and financial commitment vary. Most obviously want to move at their own speed, for a number of reasons, including in line with the concern  not to outpace the progressive building of the evidence base. We realized that donor support to countries is still highly determined and shaped by their existing aid instruments (and national aid operators). So changes will perhaps come more slowly than we would like, in this respect, but we should already appreciate that Germany, the US,  the UK and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation are already funding pilot RBF schemes in different countries.

What are the key messages for countries?

In Oslo, we discussed of course many things. Here are some interesting messages for the ones among you who are involved in formulating and implementing RBF at country level.

• RBF is recognized by the international community of aid actors as a key mechanism to accelerate progress towards the MDGs by focusing on frontline services. At country level, your own responsibility may be to use the MDG deadline to put pressure on donors and your government to commit to an agenda focusing on results. 

• Having said that, it is also crucial to keep in mind that RBF must be anchored in broader and longer term agendas such as health systems strengthening and universal health coverage. This has important consequences: for instance, there was a consensus in Oslo that aid agencies adopting the RBF approach should support a single national RBF strategy (and not develop their own schemes). Hence, at country level, keep on working on the integration of your RBF strategy in the national health care financing strategy. Among other advantages, PBF is a great entry point for your Ministry of Health to learn to purchase health services in a strategic manner. 

• Donors and agencies are willing to explore the many possible ways that exist for collaborating around RBF. For instance, it is of course possible to fund a RBF scheme without going through the Trust Fund managed by the World Bank. We felt a lot of commitment at this level, but some questions remain. We offered the service of the CoP to document and share some successful experiences (cf. Rwanda, Burundi, Benin…). 

• Senior conference participants highlighted one of the greatest assets of RBF: the emphasis the strategy puts on learning and the opportunity it offers to improving one’s action. As illustrated by the experiences from different countries presented at the meeting, and aptly summarized by Tore Godal, the convenor of the meeting, RBF is a problem-solving strategy. Having said this, we believe that even more efforts could be taken to improve PBF, among other things, by better taking into account evidence generated outside the RBF community. For instance, to our knowledge, very few RBF schemes have already responded to the large body of evidence showing that neonatal mortality is one of the new priorities in sub-Saharan Africa. By the way, this is one of the many areas where UNICEF could contribute. 

• Several experts shared their concern that at country level, RBF could suffer from system bottlenecks, such as poor availability of drugs and medical commodities. We agreed to coordinate our efforts to try to overcome this problem. On the side of the PBF CoP, our wish is to organize an event in 2014 whereby central medical stores would be able to meet their clients (health facilities). We believe that PBF has created a new ecosystem in which health facilities are much more demanding in terms of ancillary services. More about this soon.

• One of the objectives of the meeting was to discuss the next stage (what needs to happen after the pilot stage). While it is hoped that donors will maintain and expand their support, the consensus is increasingly that domestic financing – or at the very least co-financing - will be the main solution in the future, especially in non-fragile countries. Our own assessment is that there still remains much to do at this level in many countries; in terms of advocacy and engagement (especially towards the Ministries of Finance), but also in terms of support (e.g. on how to adapt public finance mechanisms). 
  

 
A global learning agenda

As observed by the participants affiliated to the World Bank, the Global Fund and GAVI, a key asset of the RBF approach could be that it will lead to more cooperation between these three agencies, something which failed to happen so far, by and large. The first signs are encouraging. This needs to be confirmed at country level, of course, but we are optimistic.

In Oslo, we all agreed that RBF is a global learning agenda and that learning should not be limited to the demonstration of the impact (or not) of a strategy. In many settings, adjustment of policies will need to take place, in an iterative process, which confirms that the knowledge agenda will have to be connected with implementation. The community of practice has its work cut out, in other words.

Notes:
(1) We also had the opportunity to attend the gala concert in honor of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize winner, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, a great experience which  compensated for the fact that this time of the year is not exactly the ideal period for visiting Norway.
(2) More about PBF in Argentina (and global football icon Lionel Messi!) in a forthcoming blog post. 

Allison Kelley

In this blog post, Allison Kelley presents a descriptive research project being carried out by experts from two communities of practice – Financial access to health services and Performance-based financing - in twelve Francophone African countries.  One of the project’s innovations is its collaborative approach.

Universal health coverage (UHC) – is higher than ever on the agenda, both nationally and internationally. Presidents, key development partners, and even international NGOs are all pushing for UHC. What consensus! And yet – as is often the case – the devil is in the details – and in this case, in the many and ever expanding number of health financing schemes in African countries: user fees, budget allocation, funding inputs, community-based health financing schemes, fee exemptions for certain population groups, exemptions for the poorest, performance-based financing… Just to illustrate my point, one of our experts has already inventoried 29 different health financing schemes in Niger!

Such fragmentation in national health financing, without even mentioning the challenges of quality and human resources, can leave one feeling perplexed in the face of all the fervour around UHC.  How can the various pieces of the health financing puzzle be assembled to constitute a coherent picture at a national level? In many countries, there are a multitude of different actors involved in the planning and implementation of such health financing schemes (HFS), all with their own objectives. Many are unaware that they are in some way contributing to UHC in their country. They may also be lukewarm at the prospect of collaborating or being “rolled up” into some sort of larger scheme.

The diversity and confusion around various aspects related to the governance, objectives, intervention level, target groups, financing sources, available budgets, eligibility criteria, management and performance of these various HFS are such that no one today has the whole picture. And yet this picture would seem essential if a country truly wants to progress toward a more efficient and equitable national health financing system. It would also help to identify population groups that are less well covered, and those that may have double coverage (and those who stand to gain from such double coverage), inefficiencies, etc. I’d even suggest that having this full picture should be a prerequisite to defining and putting in place a national health financing strategy.

A multi-country study

Thanks to French Muskoka funding (with additional resources from Cordaid), experts from two CoPs – financial access to health services and performance based-financing – are carrying out a collaborative research project in 12 sub-Saharan Francophone African countries. Their goal is to map this tangle of HFS.  At the country level, we hope that this mapping exercise will create a clearer picture of the complexity of health financing schemes in-country. By comparing across the 12 countries we hope to be able to begin to trace some recurrent situations, or patterns, that we can interpret as favourable or unfavourable (using existing knowledge of health economics and political economy) toward expanding UHC.  

A collaborative process from A to Z

If this research is modest in terms of its scientific objectives (descriptive documentation only using existing secondary data and knowledge held by experts), it is more innovative from a methodological perspective: from its conception to its end, it is a collaborative process. 

Back in Spring 2012 (yes, it can take some time to turn an idea into a reality…), we organised a “virtual brainstorming” using the on-line discussion groups of two CoPs. We asked members to suggest priority research topics for a proposal to be submitted for French Muskoka funding (UNICEF WCARO). We then put the suggested topics to an electronic vote by members. The outcome was uncontested: the top priority topic was to better understand how to link up the ever-growing number of HFS at the national level in a coherent move toward UHC.

Since so many countries were interested in the topic, we opted for a more open research model that would capture a maximum number of experiences (rather than focus in on 1-2 countries): a sort of overview of what exists, not unlike the inventory carried out to prepare for the FAHS CoP’s first workshop in Bamako. We launched a call for individual experts to carry out the research at the country level. Because the Muskoka funding covered francophone countries (and only some of those at that), we ended up with candidates for 10 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Chad, and Togo. Our open model then led us to include two “non-Muskoka” countries, Burundi and Cameroon, thanks to Cordaid funding.

After signing the contract in Spring 2013, we were able to thus put the research team in place. A study guide was drawn up and shared with this team, and then improved through their comments and suggestions. A product of real joint collaboration!

What’s next

The research is finally underway. Researchers on the team are in continuous discussion on challenges, tips, and strategies for obtaining the financial data they need…

The results from this first phase of research – a mapping of HFS in 12 countries and a synthesis of the situation across these countries – will be presented at the March AfHEA conference in Nairobi shared more broadly by mid 2014.  This picture of almost a quarter of the countries in Africa should suggest some more general lessons and perhaps even some recommendations.

In early 2014, we will begin preparing the second phase of the research (to take place in 2014-15). Our intention is to develop a more in-depth questionnaire that we will test in at least one country. Phase 2 will thus take a “deep dive” in a number of countries (providing sufficient funding is available). We will attempt to document efficiency and equity losses due to overlapping and duplicative HFS and to identify areas for improvement. We expect that this second phase will produce concrete recommendations for each country studied in-depth.

This type of research project is definitely uncharted territory for the CoPs. Its the first time we have solicited member involvement for this sort of documentation. What we find especially interesting is getting involved in an area of research that is relatively less popular – multi-country studies and cross-country analysis. Between individual studies on health financing in a particular country and the tables WHO produces annually on international health spending, we think there is room!  And CoPs may just have a role to play, given their members span almost every country on the African continent. Still, our ability to succeed at such endeavours will depend on factors like our ability to coordinate amongst ourselves, and to help each other out where necessary. We certainly plan to document this original, collaborative research model along the way.

So stay tuned for preliminary results in early 2014. Here’s hoping that we can contribute to making more of the existing multiple and diverse HFS to expand UHC.

Bruno Meessen

In this blog, Bruno Meessen (ITM, Antwerp and facilitator of the PBF CoP) shows how Results Based Financing could be a lever for African governments in the battle for family planning …  and even more so, when other influential actors in society are hostile.

On sticks, carrots and sermons

Whether you are a general, the leader of a gang, the boss of a big company, or a parent desperately trying to maintain authority, you have three main instruments to steer the behavior of your fellows and subordinates: sticks, carrots and sermons.

The metaphor of a ‘stick’ describes the variety of devices you have at your disposal to deter and, if necessary, punish behavior not in line with your objectives.  This is the fine a policeman gives you if he sees you driving without a seatbelt, for example, or the shot in the knee (at best) for the villain who betrays his boss, the non-renewal of a contract for a supplier due to poor service,… 

The ‘carrot’ is of course used as a metaphor for a reward. A medal for a brave soldier, for example, a diploma for a diligent student, the price paid to a baker for his delicious bread and of course, pay for performance, which I’m sure I don’t have to explain on this blog.

By ‘sermons’, we mean all strategies and tools of education and persuasion. Economists will tell you that these aim to change the preferences of economic agents. More prosaically, the aim is a situation where your fellows, convinced by the strength of your discourse, spontaneously adopt behavior aligned with your goals. This usually happens after you have offered convincing arguments, but if you also have a certain moral authority (like the mother has towards her child, the teacher versus his students, or the priest towards the parishioners), you have an additional advantage.

These tools all have their strengths and weaknesses, and need to be assessed in their particular situation. PBF experts, if they believe in the power of ‘carrots’, also know carrots can’t change all behaviors. ‘Sermons’ will be particularly useful when it’s impossible to verify behavior or when behavior that needs to be encouraged is also beneficial for the one adopting the behavior (example: usage of a condom). Note also that the times are changing: our societies cherish more and more individual freedom and responsibility. ‘Sticks’ are thus less and less tolerated and certain forms used in the past are now even prohibited by law.

Let's appreciate the opportunity offered by Results-Based Financing (RBF)

These are thus the three tools available to governments to influence the behavior of their citizens. In this respect, it is clear that RBF, by its very  nature, is a significant enrichment of the toolbox of African governments. But my wish is that they use this instrument in an even more strategic way, more in particular when they face other leaders promoting views contrary to their own vision of development.

Let’s give an example. Imagine a country which faces a serious demographic problem, to the extent that the high birth rate puts more and more pressure on the economy and more fundamentally, undermines the opportunities which could be available to citizens in the future. Imagine that the government has identified family planning by informed parents as a human right, on the one hand, and as a necessity to boost the development of the country, on the other hand. Imagine then that a prominent religious leader promotes a totally different vision … with a sermon, of course.

What should the government do in this case? Should it opt for the ‘stick’ (eg summon the hierarchy of the religious leader, with the threat of a sanction), or for a confrontation of ‘sermon’ (by the president) versus sermon (of the bishop, for example) on the issue at stake? If I were president of this (imaginary) country, I would think twice. If the bishop (for example) has dared to challenge you over this issue, it’s no doubt because he knows that the balance of power is not exactly in favor of you for the moment. At certain times in the life of a politician, a public confrontation on a particular topic can obviously harm his (or her) goals: the church he/she faces can be very powerful; moreover, given the church’s commitment to social sectors (schools, health centers, …) it will remain a partner for the government to work with. So it’s important to choose your battles – but this, we don’t have to tell politicians.

Results-Based Financing: a powerful lever for change

Faced with this situation, are you powerless then? Before RBF, this was probably the case. However, I think RBF now offers new and ‘smart’ opportunities for government action. The first option, if it hasn’t been implemented yet, is to add family planning to the grid of PBF of health centers (i.e. to reward the health centre for each new woman adopting a modern contraceptive method). If family planning indicators are already present, the government could increase reimbursement rates (as it has been done in Burundi late 2012). This may be powerful, but not enough, especially if many health facilities are affiliated to the church challenging your national policy! I supect that the real breakthrough will come from  involving the communities. First, the government could, like in Makamba (Burundi), contract community associations to refer women interested in family planning. But the government could go even further: it could decide to introduce a voucher system which would encourage women to adopt a modern contraception method. To distribute these vouchers in the community, we would mobilize of course the many female community health workers (with a small compensation for every woman they refer to the health center!). Being wives, mothers, sisters, friends and neighbors, I’m sure they would find the right words to convince their peers.  

By mobilizing the women in communities in Africa and tapping a peer-to-peer educational strategy, it seems to be me RBF can mobilize hundreds of thousands of very persuasive agents who can even beat seasoned preachers, if need be! 

Let us forward this message to political leaders of Africa.



Looking for more resources on RBF & family planning? 

Reproductive Health Vouchers: from promise to practice, T. Boler & L. Harris, 2010, Marie Stopes International.
Voucher schemes for sexual and reproductive health services: a Marie Stopes International (MSI) perspective, factsheet.
Can incentives strengthen access to quality family planning services? Lessons from Burundi, Kenya and Liberia, L. Morgan, 2012, Health Systems 20/20, USAID.  

Jean-Benoît Falisse

We continue our exploration of community participation in Africa, 25 years after the Bamako Initiative. Dr. Canut Nkuzimana is a member the CoP Performance Based Financing since its inception. He worked with the Ministry of Health of Burundi in the late 1990s before joining Cordaid. He had the opportunity to participate in the set-up of the first health committees of Burundi and in the development of performance-based financing (PBF) initiatives in the country. More recently, he has been active in launching a new "community PBF" project. Here I chat with him about his experiences.

You had the opportunity to establish health committees in southern Burundi on behalf of Memisa (future Cordaid). How did that happen?

In February 2002, when Memisa recruited me to pilot its primary care health project in Makamba, the region was still a war zone. More than 40% of the population of the province lived in internally displaced people’s (IDP) sites. These sites where places of poverty, disease and abuse of all kinds; they were located around the health centres and the schools. Some of these facilities had even stopped working in order to shelter those displaced by war. In the health centres that were still functioning, the management was calamitous; qualified staff had often deserted the place and the remaining staff members were running the centre as they liked. There was no follow-up. My project aimed to revive the activities in health centres and to develop nursing stations. The idea was to allow people to have access to a minimal package of services: immunization, family planning, and curative services.

At the time, the WHO and the Ministry of Health had begun to promote the idea of organizing the population to be the co-managers of their health services. The context of Makamba made us act. The population would be the co-manager of the aid it received. To get there, sensitization activities were conducted for the administrative authority (on the relevance of the project), the population (on the importance of management and accountability) and the staff of health centres (on the need to work with the population). After these sessions, we organized a general meeting in each health area, in collaboration with the local and the health sector (soon to renamed health district) authorities. The population received a preliminary explanation about the nature, the mission, the composition and the responsibilities of the health committees before they elected their members.

The idea was that the inhabitants of each “hill” (“colline”: the lowest administrative level in Burundi) of the health area would elect two people (a man and a woman, from two different sides of the hill) on the basis of their integrity, dedication to the cause, and willingness to represent them in the health committee. Once elected, the health committee members would set up an executive office. The elections were followed by training and a long monitoring process. The population was proud to participate in the management of health centres and it was a starting point for organizing effective community participation.

Was it easy to implement? Did it work?

In 2002, the health committee strategy was obvious and easy to implement because: (1) the population was living in IDP sites and was therefore easy to gather, (2) the crisis made the population particularly sensitive to health issues and, (3) as a donor we were influential in the health facilities and population.

The “community strategy” also allowed us to work on the flexibility and integration of various community health workers who had been working in solo and without funding until then and were only used occasionally, during epidemics.

Finally, as structures for community dialogue, the health committees helped us in identifying and monitoring the care of vulnerable people (“indigents”) by health centres and their referral to the hospitals.

In 2006, free health care for pregnant women and children under five was put in place in Burundi. Various funding initiatives based on performance were also introduced at that time. What is the role of community participation in those schemes?

On free health care first; the role of the health committee is to clarify these aspects of maternal and child health and to inform the population of the MoH guidelines. It is the health committee that must explain to the households the need to register births and bring those documents at the health facility. The health committees allow better monitoring to ensure that the system is fair and that everybody is covered. It defends the rights of the beneficiaries in the health area.

Regarding PBF, the interaction with the community is at three levels. First, the health committee is the co-manager of the health facility and participates in its development plan, which is the tool for negotiating the PBF contract. Second, there is the establishment of a system of contracting community health workers. Finally, the PBF system will hire local associations to participate in the audit of the health facilities (community assessment).

There has been a “community PBF” experiment in Burundi; could you tell us what it is?

Like the “clinical” PBF that subsidizes the services provided by health facilities, the community PBF subsidizes the results achieved by community health workers (CHWs). The activities of these agents focus on three dimensions: sensitization for the use of services, the recovery of dropouts (vaccination, tuberculosis, ART, etc.), distributions of nets, contraceptives, etc. (see table below for a list of the subsidised indicators - $1 = BIF1530 ).

Wouldn’t your reflection on the limits of voluntary work equally apply to the health committees?

For health committees, the issue of volunteering was somehow overcome through the implementation of the PBF. We felt that if the health centre pays benefits to the members of its health committee, the health committee may lost its representative dimension (the motivation to be elected would be biased). Therefore, we designed a formula that recommended to health facilities to assist the functioning of the health committee via a contribution of 5% of what they receive through the PBF. The amount that is given is not a premium; it is a contribution to the operation costs. The COSA can buy pens, paper, binders, etc. And whether it wants to pay its member a drink on meeting day, it is up to it. Revenues that are generated at the health centre are in a sense a community input, so it makes sense that some of that money is used for the proper functioning of the co-managing unit of the community health centre.                                                                                                                                                                                              Group of community health workers (Province Makamba) Photo: Korachais     
Does community participation in health have a future in the Great Lakes region?

Yes, but it starts with peace. Without it, it is difficult to continue to work with communities in the long run. At the same time, in our context, the community approach provides an opportunity to bring people together, to unite them around a common vision/interest. Through “Community PBF”, there is even a possibility to inject some funds and organize the community level. A community that is occupied, works, and has a common interest, is much less likely to be manipulated or to return to violence. The second condition is that the health systems understand the importance of the community and plans some funding of this level. It is indeed necessary to organize training for these community actors.

Bruno Meessen

The Performance Based Financing Community of Practice (PBF CoP) started 3 years ago in Bujumbura and hasn't stopped growing since then.  We have the pleasure to present you Dr. Fodé Cissé who, two weeks ago, became the 1000th member of the PBF CoP. We wish him a warm welcome and hope that he will enjoy our knowledge community. Fodé registered from Kigali, where he was following a PBF training.


Dear Fodé, we would like to know more about the 1000th member of the PBF CoP. Could you please introduce yourself?

I am 39 years old and I have the Guinean nationality. I'm married and father of 3. I'm a medical doctor, specialized in the management of health services. After having finished my medical studies, I worked for Médecins Sans Frontières Belgium from 2000 till 2002, on a project taking care of Tuberculosis and HIV in Guinea. After that I joined the Ministry of Public Health in 2004 after having finished my Master in Management of Health Services. There, I was responsible for the follow-up evaluation of the TB Program (2004-2007).  I was also Head of the Global Fund project (2007-2012). In this position, I did several international consultancies dealing with the design and implementation of health projects.  At the moment, I work for the Strategies and Development Office of the Ministry of Public Health, where I am in charge of studies and planning.

You registered to the CoP from Kigali. Could you please tell us a bit about what you learned from your stay in Rwanda?

It was my second stay in Rwanda. Every time I come here, I think about the principles of non-violence and the love of one’s neighbor. The genocide sufficiently proves that mankind is ready to do anything in order to achieve its goals. This tragedy should inspire all people of the world in general and African people in particular who are getting introduced to democracy. This introduction sometimes causes a fratricidal struggle between brothers and sisters of the same village who have lived together peacefully for a long time. As far as the health system of Rwanda is concerned, I found that, compared to our system, it has a high standard. The Performance Based Financing system is already operational; I've also been able to see that it has been adapted to the Rwandese situation.

Do you think that PBF has a future in Guinea?  According to you, what problems of the health system could this strategy, at least partly, address?

To your question whether the FBP has any future in Guinea I can say "yes", without any doubt. The Guinean health system  – just like the health system of other countries of the sub-region - suffers from structural weaknesses, which impede to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.  Among these weaknesses, I particularly think of the problem of financing the sector, the lack of access to quality care and the poor governance. Looking at these shortcomings, the introduction of the PBF will undoubtedly allow breathing new life into the health system of my country: the Primary Health Care strategy, as it has been implemented till now, has shown its limitations.

Therefore, I call upon the Guinean health authorities on all levels, as well as their technical and financial partners, to adopt PBF as a new instrument to resolve the recurring problems which our health system is currently facing.    

Gyuri Fritsche

On 26 April Robert Soeters, overwhelmed and blushingly accepted a Royal decoration from the hands of Mayor Jozias van Aartsen in an annual public ceremony colloquially called the lintjes regen (the decorations rainfall). A close group of friends, colleagues and members of family had organized and requested the nomination without Robert’s knowledge, and had lured him from Africa (where he is mostly found) to The Hague (where he sometimes resides) for a work meeting after which he was ushered in front of the decorating official. Robert has worked his entire professional career with passion on refining a sophisticated public health intervention that has gained currency as ‘Performance-based financing’. Please join us in calling Robert from now on ‘Sir Robert’!

Ce 26 avril, submergé par l'émotion et rougissant, Robert Soeters a accepté une décoration royale des mains du Maire Jozias van Aaartsen lors d'une cérémonie publique annuelle familièrement appelé le lintjes regen (pluie des décorations). Un groupe d'amis proches, collègues et membres de la famille avait organisé et proposé sa nomination, à son insu. Ils ont dû le tirer d'Afrique (où il se trouve principalement) pour le faire venir à La Haye (où il réside parfois) pour une réunion de travail, après quoi il a été conduit devant l'officiel en charge des décorations. Robert a travaillé toute sa carrière professionnelle avec passion à peaufiner une intervention sophistiquée de santé publique qui est connue aujourd'hui comme le « financement basé sur la performance ». S'il vous plaît joignez vous à nous pour appeler Robert à partir de maintenant 'Sir Robert'!

The second part of our interview with Dr. Agostino Paganini brings us to the evolution of the Bamako Initiative over time and its political feature. Agostino Paganini has an extensive experience of primary health care and emergency health care in Africa, an area in which he has been active for over forty years now.  He was the manager of the Bamako Initiative (BI) Support Unit at the UNICEF HQ. The unit worked closely with African countries that had shown interest in the principles of the BI. In the 1990s’ and 2000s’, he continued to work with UNICEF as a Team Leader for Health in Emergencies and as a country director in Somalia. He has also done senior consultancy work with the World Bank and advises the director of CUAMM (Doctors With Africa).

In retrospect, some people say the Bamako agenda has rarely been properly implemented. In a post on this blog and in an article, Valery Ridde says we me be better abolishing the Bamako Initiative (it is of course a provocation). How do you view the implementation of the Bamako principles until now?

Absolutely. I think this initiative died a long time ago. I think some of the principles are still incredibly valid and some of the problems it was trying to address also still exist. The problem of public accountability and people participation in the management of their health system should be have been better addressed with more democracy but still, it is left unattended in many African countries. The problem of out-of-pocket expenditures with no rules is also still extremely valid. We can call it Bamako Initiative or we can call it the way we want, it does not really matter: some of the problems which the Bamako was trying to address are still there and some of the experiences and principles (some have been applied and some have been badly applied) are still very relevant. But as an initiative, no, I do not think there is such thing as a Bamako Initiative alive at the moment. At least I have not seen anything. 

Would you agree with Susan Rifkin who says that the Bamako Initiative has widened the horizons of community participation? Do you see the current shift from community participation to community accountability as another widening?

Let's be clear, community accountability is accountability towards the community. The difference now is that communities become shareholders. Before they were paying under the table, now they pay and they can ask, what have you done with the money, why have you not done this or that? This is the difference between a vague participatory process and being represented and part of the management of the health unit. And this is something we still need to work on. People have no voice and no exit in low-income countries, except to go to the private sector, but this is not for the poor.

In her recent interview on this blog, Sassy Molyneux insists that we must “carefully consider remuneration and other forms of incentives for community representatives, the challenges of asymmetries between health staff and community representatives in resources and power, and the importance of building trustful relationships”. To me, this sounds a bit like considering the local politics of health. It always struck me how little attention seems to be paid to politics in the BI. We are in a sort of political process, right?

It is political. And not understanding that it is political is the biggest mistake you could do. I think that within the public health community we are sometimes very naïve. We think about supervision and training as the keys to everything but health is political. This is why the US has its health system and this is why Scandinavians have a different health system. Science is science but how science is available as well as the quality of and equity in access to care are political issues. We have to accept it is a though road to get to high quality equitable health care and we are not there yet. There still is a huge asymmetry between the health staff and the people and it is a sign that democracy is not there yet. We need to start from this problem. What I have seen with the Bamako Initiative is a deeply political, not a strictly technical, issue. But of course, people use things and declarations in different ways and they have used this initiative according to their own interests and point of view.

Twenty five years have passed. You have an extensive experience of primary health care in low income countries. According to you, what will be the keys for primary health care in the next 25 years?

What I see coming is more privatisation and more urbanisation. People seem to find in urban areas and even in slums opportunities they do not have in their rural areas. Some countries are growing and establishing health insurance which is an excellent thing I think. At the end of my time working on the Bamako Initiative, we were working on two things (there were two teams). One was community-based monitoring, because data are power. The other was local insurance. Health insurance is a key issue but it is difficult to establish. In many case they start at the national level; yet, in Europe local solidarity mechanisms were the initial insurances.

We need to work on public accountability and equity. These are the two key areas. Are we going in this direction? I am not sure. I think in some countries we are, but in a majority of other countries the private sector is growing as people have more resources and the public sector remains under-financed. What is more, this public sector is very inefficient unless there is public accountability. This is the mixed picture I have. On one side, they are countries progressing, doing very going things. Take for instance the experience of Rwanda with community-based health insurance (French: mutuelles de santé) and new staff remuneration policy. But on the other side, there are many others I think are not going in the same direction.

Any questions I have not asked and you would have liked me to ask or any conclusion you would like to make?

Not really, for me, as I said, it was a fascinating experience. I realised it was also a fascinating debate. Some of the issues are, as I said, very political and some are extremely relevant now. We have to address the relation between the patient, the client and the provider. The current debate of performance-based financing, which is linking financing not to the drugs but to the results, is also extremely interesting. Of course, it will not solve all the problems. I think we should be able to see what the good experiences were in the past and move on, adding on new experiences and new things. Basic public accountability and the role of people is extremely important, good governance of health facilities is very important but result-based financing of health facilities is also very promising if we combine it with other things we have learned. We should not move from fashion to fashion but take the past into account, understand what we have learned and build on it.

Isidore Sieleunou (AEDES & co-facilitator of the CoP Financial Access to Health Services) interviews Anna Gorter on a recent evidence review she co-authored with Por Ir (National Institute of Public Health, Phnom Penh) and Bruno Meessen (Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp). The review, commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, is accessible on the German Health Practice Collection website, here (together with other documents and power points).

Your literature review is timely for the hot debate on Result Based Financing (RBF). Could you summarize its key findings?

RBF is a relative new approach in health in Low and Low-middle-Income Countries (LLMIC). It is an answer to the disappointing results of the health sectors to meet public expectations and reduce maternal, neonatal and child mortality and morbidity. Many governments are aware of the low performance of their service providers and are ready to test new approaches health. As a result a wide range of approaches has been developed, whereby payment of providers is linked to the results providers achieve.

Our review focused on maternal and neonatal health care and on the effects on the performance of health care providers. We investigated four approaches: performance based financing (PBF), performance based contracting (PBC), vouchers, and Results Based Budgeting (RBB) (also named performance-based budgeting or intra-governmental transfers). We looked at utilisation of services, quality of services, and equity (i.e. if the approach was pro-poor, reducing the rich-poor gap in access to care). There were little or no studies on cost-effectiveness or sustainability. All in all we found 70 research papers for 37 programmes, of which 27 had a rigorous design and which were used for the final conclusions.  

The strongest evidence was found for vouchers, with robust evidence that vouchers can increase utilisation and quality of services, and improve equity. For PBF we found robust evidence that they can improve quality, but insufficient evidence for utilisation and equity. For PBC we found modest evidence for utilisation and equity and insufficient evidence for quality. For RBB there were not enough studies. Vouchers are a much older approach (since 1964), while PBF and PBC only started a decade ago, hence the difference in evidence.     

You have been working on the voucher approach for a substantial part of your career. Which place do you see for vouchers in Africa?

For me, vouchers have always been the tool par excellence to reach disadvantaged populations with critical services, such as mother and child care, family planning, STI and HIV care, cervical cancer, etc.  That is assisting the poorest or otherwise disadvantaged in using health services, which are important for their health, but which they are not using currently.

We developed the approach in 1995 in Nicaragua, basically to assist sex workers and adolescents to access sexual and reproductive health. We saw it as a way to overcome financial barriers as well as to improve the quality of care which was also an important barrier for these groups. The results were much better than we ever expected and that is when we started to analyse the reasons for this success. Vouchers provide strong incentives on the demand side (they inform, they guide, they empower the clients) as well as on the supply side (health providers are motivated to attract more clients and contracts demand also improved technical quality). 

I think that vouchers do have a place in Africa, especially in targeting those populations which are currently not reached and also in driving improvements of provision of services at the facilities. In the Kenya voucher scheme we have seen that providers invest the voucher revenue in improving the functionality of their facility and increasing their capacity (sending staff to be trained in long term family planning, repairing their buildings and ambulances, buying equipment, supplies, new maternity wards and operating theatres etc.). Vouchers could be used for especially critical services, where other approaches have not worked. 

In Africa, many countries have launched at the same time – sometimes in parallel – various health care financing approaches. Would it not make sense to merge them? Could you tell us what could be the effect of a combination of two or more RBF approaches, for instance PBF, Vouchers and even targeted free health services?

Combining PBF and vouchers would certainly increase the effectiveness of both approaches, although this has not be done so far. As described above, vouchers can bring in clients who need services but who even in the presence of a PBF still do not come to the health facility. Distributing the vouchers provides an opportunity to give face-to-face relevant information on particular health services and where these can be obtained. The voucher itself inspires confidence in the clients that they actually will be attended, and this is especially important for the poorest or otherwise disadvantaged groups, who often lack self-confidence. Furthermore, additional benefits can be added to the voucher such as payment of transportation costs if that is an important barrier.  In that sense, a voucher program on top of a PBF scheme would enhance equity and reduce the rich-poor gap. Vouchers are in fact free health services targeted to special needy groups.

You worked a lot in Central America and more recently in Asia. Several RBF schemes documented in your review are indeed from those continents. What can Africa learn from them?

I think the most important lesson observed in my work is that in each country I visited there are huge population groups who are in need of particular health services but not use them because the access barriers are simply too great to overcome. Vouchers can assist them to overcome these barriers, both barriers at the demand side as well as at the supply side. In fact I think an important reason for vouchers to be so effective in the above described effects on utilization, quality and equity is because they alter behaviour of clients and providers at the same time. However, taken into account the many successful PBF programmes in Africa, I think there is a new role for vouchers and that is bringing in those clients who still not come. This would make the PBF programmes stronger and more effective in increasing the health of the poorest and most disadvantaged groups in Africa.

Serge Mayaka


Serge Mayaka (Ecole de Santé Publique Kinshasa, doctorant à l’Université Catholique de Louvain) interviewe Maria Bertone (doctorante à la London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine) et Bruno Meessen (IMT, Anvers) sur leur récent article présentant un cadre d'analyse pour étudier les liens entre les arrangements institutionnels et la performance des systèmes de santé, avec une application à deux expériences FBP au Burundi.

 On peut dire que votre article tombe à point nommé pour le débat sur le Financement Basé sur la Performance (FBP). Pourriez-vous nous résumer ses messages principaux?

Maria Bertone: Le papier poursuit deux objectifs. C’est tout d’abord une contribution sur le plan conceptuel. Il s’agit d’articuler différents concepts issus de la Nouvelle Economie Institutionnelle pour faciliter l’étude des systèmes de santé. Concrètement, le papier propose un cadre d’analyse simplifié pour analyser des modifications des arrangements institutionnels structurant un système de santé. L’article comporte, à titre illustratif, une application du cadre d’analyse à deux expériences pilotes de FBP au Burundi. Cette application au FBP permet dès lors l’atteinte d’un 2° résultat : dégager des leçons sur des enjeux de design et de mise en œuvre du FBP. L’atteinte de ce second résultat valide d’une certaine façon notre proposition théorique.

Si l’article n’apportera probablement pas beaucoup au FBP du Burundi (depuis cette étude, un modèle unifié a été mis en place à l’échelle du pays), certaines leçons plus génériques peuvent être intéressantes, par exemple en matière d’évaluation des dispositifs FBP. Si nous ne contestons pas la nécessité d’études d’impact, l’article rappelle que la configuration institutionnelle de chaque FBP est différente et que chaque étude d’impact devra donc être interprétée en tenant compte de la nature particulière de ce dernier.

Plusieurs auteurs ont récemment prôné l’approche des « systèmes adaptatifs complexes » pour étudier les systèmes de santé. Une telle suggestion a été faite pour le FBP, notamment pour dégager les effets inattendus. Avez-vous répondu à leur recommandation?

Bruno Meessen : Je ne suis pas très familier avec cette approche; je serais curieux de voir ce qui pourrait en sortir, après application au FBP. La seule chose que je puisse en dire est que ce serait une erreur de l’adopter  avec le présupposé qu’on serait en manque de clés pour comprendre le FBP, ses intentions et ses effets. Le message sous-jacent de notre article est que la Nouvelle Economie Institutionnelle est un corpus théorique puissant pour mieux comprendre comment réformer les systèmes de santé. A titre personnel, je peux en tout cas dire qu’elle m’a aidé à structurer ma propre réflexion théorique et politique ces dix dernières années.

A cet égard, peut-être l’article va-t-il aussi évacuer un malentendu. Ça va surprendre certains médecins lisant cet interview, mais j’ai déjà entendu la critique que « le problème du FBP est qu’il a été conçu par des médecins, pas par des économistes de la santé: les concepteurs ne connaissent pas la vaste littérature sur les mécanismes de paiement». Avec cet article, nous voulions montrer qu’au contraire, les fondements théoriques du FBP sont substantiels. Ils sont peut-être même plus englobants que la littérature de l’économie de la santé : de fait, pour traiter des questions comme la redistribution des rôles dans un système ou l’introduction de nouvelles règles du jeu, l’économie des organisations (organisation economics) est une boîte à outils bien plus étoffée.

Maria, quelle suggestion ferais-tu à un jeune chercheur qui voudrait appliquer ce cadre d’analyse, par exemple s’il aborde le FBP dans un contexte différent de celui du Burundi ?

Adapter et appliquer le cadre analytique à une situation précise a été un exercice stimulant. Cela m’a forcé à regarder les deux expériences depuis une nouvelle perspective. J’ai été surprise par le fait qu’il m’ait permis de découvrir de nouveaux aspects et de mieux comprendre pourquoi les deux dispositifs fonctionnaient différemment.

Je dirais que l’application du cadre nécessite certaines notions théoriques et une compréhension du programme de la Nouvelle Economie Institutionnelle. Au mieux, nous avons là un « squelette », il reste à chaque chercheur de mettre la « chair » dessus.  Si un bagage en sciences sociales est sans doute souhaitable, nous espérons que le papier va faciliter le dialogue entre économistes et théoriciens des systèmes de santé. Il permet en tout cas d’établir des liens avec des travaux antérieurs (par exemple ceux de Thomas Bossert sur les droits décisionnels) et contemporains (par exemple ceux de Kenneth Leonard sur la motivation).

Les jeunes chercheurs apprécieront sans doute la démonstration que les études de cas sont légitimes en matière de FBP. On pourrait certainement faire plus d’études de cas comparatives.

Bruno, Maria parle de « squelette ». Dans quelle direction, vois-tu les développements scientifiques, en particulier dans le domaine du FBP ?

BM: Les développements possibles sont multiples. Ma recommandation aux chercheurs qui ne veulent ou ne peuvent conduire une étude d’impact est de se concentrer sur ce qui pourrait expliquer que l’on n’obtienne pas ce qu’on l’espérait obtenir avec le FBP (ou que l’on obtienne quelque chose que l’on ne voulait pas obtenir !). Les raisons de « plantage » d’un dispositif FBP sont multiples, mais elles s’inscriraient probablement dans trois grandes catégories (non-exclusives): soit c’est le design qui était mauvais, soit c’est le processus de mise en œuvre qui a été inapproprié, soit c’est la théorie FBP qui est défaillante.

Notre cadre d’analyse vise avant tout à étudier les erreurs du premier type : une inadéquation entre un design et un contexte, qui aboutit au final à un résultat sous-optimal. Autrement dit, le FBP était mal conçu (par exemple, parce qu'on a fait du FBP en couper/coller). A cet égard, les développements du cadre d’analyse pourraient aller vers plus de détails dans la description des arrangements institutionnels, des droits de propriété ou des rapports de force entre acteurs.

Il y a ensuite les erreurs du second type, lors de la mise en oeuvre. Comme la montré la littérature récente sur les gratuités des soins, documenter ces problèmes est relativement trivial et il ne faudra probablement pas s’encombrer d’éléments trop théoriques. Je ne suis pas sûr donc que notre cadre d’analyse sera d’une grande utilité.

Mais il existe un troisième type d’erreurs : celles qui découleraient de faiblesse dans la théorie sous-tendant les propositions FBP. La recherche peut aider à réduire ce risque en consolidant les bases théoriques du FBP. Des chercheurs bien équipés en sciences humaines et méthodes empiriques pourraient creuser les mécanismes d’ordre plus psychologique, notamment les aspects motivationnels et cognitifs. La « théorie FBP » repose en effet sur l’hypothèse de l’homo oeconomicus. La force de cette dernière en termes de modélisation et prédiction n’est plus à démontrer, mais elle reste une simplification de la psychologie humaine). Notre cadre laisse ainsi indéterminée la question de l’interaction entre la motivation extrinsèque et la motivation intrinsèque. Nous ne disons rien non plus sur comment les individus modifient leurs préférences, développent des attentes ou traitent l’information qu’on leur dispense. Ce sont des aspects qui peuvent peser (dans un sens comme dans un autre) dans l’efficacité d’une révision d’arrangements institutionnels. C’est sans doute le programme de recherche le plus ambitieux, qui demande de se défaire de ses propres convictions et de s’appliquer dans ses travaux empiriques. Quelqu’un comme Kenneth Leonard montre la voie.

Revenons maintenant à votre étude au Burundi. Maria, peux-tu nous résumer les principaux résultats de la comparaison des deux expériences Fbp de Ngozi et Bubanza?

MB: Notre analyse explique comment et pourquoi les deux dispositifs ont fonctionné différemment. J’insisterais sur trois résultats.

Le premier porte sur le rôle de l’agence d’achat. Nous montrons que son rôle a été organisé de façon différente dans les deux projets. A Ngozi, la fonction d’achat était tenue par un comité constitué de représentant de l’agence de mise en œuvre (l’Institut Tropical Suisse) et la hiérarchie sanitaire locale, sous la présidence du directeur de la province sanitaire. A Bubanza, la fonction a été assignée à une agence indépendante gérée par l’ONG (Cordaid). Cette seconde approche a permis une définition bien plus claire des responsabilités et limité les conflits d’intérêt ; son inconvénient est qu’elle a abouti à une transfert excessif de « droits décisionnels » (un concept-clé dans la Nouvelle Economie Institutionnelle) à une agence externe à la structure de l’Etat. Pour la petite histoire, la question de l’identité de l’acteur qui doit détenir la fonction d’achat a suscité un débat très vif au Burundi en 2009. Au final, le Ministère de la Santé et ses partenaires ont innové et opté pour un modèle mixte sécurisant tant l’implication de l’Etat que celle d’acteurs externes.

Deuxièmement, notre analyse montre que le support et la guidance fournis aux formations sanitaires lors de l’introduction d’un dispositif FBP – ce qui est souvent référé sous le vocable de coaching par les experts FBP- sont clés pour le succès d’un FBP. En effet, il est crucial d’aider les prestataires de soins à comprendre la teneur des nouvelles institutions, des nouvelles règles du jeux, qui sont mises en place. Dans notre analyse, il apparaît que le coaching est en fait un mécanisme ‘soft’ mais puissant dans l’imposition (enforcement en anglais) et l’adoption des nouvelles règles du jeux. Dans les interventions FBP, il est souvent pensé que la vérification est le principal mécanisme d’imposition des règles – notre analyse montre que les agences d’achat ont en fait une palette d’instruments.

Ceci nous amène à notre troisième leçon. Un de ces instruments est la rhétorique. Nous avons découvert une relative divergence entre cette dernière et les pratiques concrètes des acteurs sur le terrain. Par exemple, à Bubanza, les experts interviewés mais aussi leurs documents de référence mettaient en avant le concept de la ‘boîte noire’, qui réfère à l’autonomie totale des prestataires dans leur utilisation des ressources financières collectées grâce au FBP. En pratique, le coaching que l’agence d’achat ainsi que certains outils de gestion (comme le ‘business plan’, qui dans le « langage FBP » réfère à un plan d’actions) réduisent cette autonomie. Il ne s’agit pas ici de dire que le coaching ou les plans d’action sont inutiles – que du contraire ! – mais de montrer combien ce qui est mis en œuvre peut diverger du plan et de la rhétorique. D’autres chercheurs, comme Freddie Ssengooba dans son analyse de l’expérience pilote en Ouganda (qui pour rappel, n’était pas un FBP comme on l’entend aujourd’hui en Afrique), avaient déjà montré une divergence entre le plan et la mise en œuvre ; il l’expliquait par les difficultés de mise en œuvre.

La situation que nous décrivons est différente. Elle est plutôt analogue à celle identifiée par Jean-Benoît Falisse relativement au mécanisme de ‘voix des usagers’, qui n'est peut-être pas aussi effectif qu'on ne le prétend. Notre analyse institutionnelle suggère que la rhétorique est en fait un mécanisme cognitif clé pour imposer les nouvelles règles du jeu. Au stade initial d’introduction d’un FBP, une rhétorique cohérente, radicale et forte va aider à marquer le changement avec le passé, à clarifier la teneur des nouvelles règles du jeu. Ceci jette une autre lumière sur la rhétorique « FBP », qui nous le savons, irrite certains observateurs : elle a une fonction interne pour faciliter l’adoption des nouvelles institutions. 

Aux lecteurs de juger, mais nous pensons que ces trois exemples montrent qu’une analyse institutionnelle approfondie des expériences FBP peut être riche d’enseignements. Nous sommes certainement curieux de connaître leur avis.