Jean-Benoît Falisse


Dr. Walter Kessler worked for Doctors Without Borders - Belgium (MSF) in the 1980s. Together with Eric Goemaere, he was one of the architects of the of the ‘health stores’ project, an experience that had greatly inspired the Bamako Initiative as the project was based on both cost recovery and community participation. Later on, Walter also worked on the implementation of the Bamako Initiative in Chad. He discusses these two experiences.

Can you start by telling us about the first project in which you were involved in, the “health stores"? What was the idea? In what context did it occur?

In 1984, during an exploratory mission in the sixth region of Mali (Timbuktu) and after several years of drought, MSF discovered a situation that was critical in every respect: socio-economic, sanitary, and food-wise. The decision was then taken to intervene and two things were set up: (1) a supply system of essential medicines for the health system; and (2) feeding centres for malnourished children. The centres were quickly operational and ran rehabilitation and nutrition education programmes. They also integrated other routine activities of the health centres. But it was not enough. Without massive food aid, the situation could only get worse. In a context of persistent drought, the population had exhausted all forms of food reserves, including seeds.

Events then precipitated: the donors came forward and MSF quickly became a major player in the widespread distribution of grains in the form of food-for-work activities. Food was given out in compensation for work that was organised following various community initiatives, such as the repair of water dykes or the rehabilitation of schools and health clinics.

To support food aid and the drug supply system, MSF also implemented a strategy of "health and drought stores". The idea was to create points for the supply of different basic items such as seeds, spare parts for irrigation pumps, or essential medicines for hospitals and clinics. It would then establish a buffer, a capacity of resilience of the supply system. This system had to be sustainable and a cost recovery approach was therefore chosen. "Stores" would sell their products.

What did the health stores bring new?

In fact, there first was a transition from the emergency "health and drought stores" to the "health stores". These structures were supposed to supply dispensaries and hospitals, given that the already existing “people’s pharmacies” could not do that anymore.

Health stores were accompanied by several innovations, at the medical level first:

• The concept of essential drugs was something new. The list of products used was that of MSF. The “people's pharmacy”, which was the traditional supply system, proposed wholesaler packages for some molecules, but shortages were common. Hence the import of stocks of drugs for the 5th and 6th and health region.
• Similarly, trainings on the use of essential drugs (prescription, dosage, etc.) were organized for the medical staffs.
• A system for recording visits was set up and operated at the health facility-level. Indeed, the rationale for the use of drugs should be based on the morbidity encountered.

And what was new in terms of health services management? Did community participation originate in food-for-work activities?

Yes, building on community experiences during the food-for-work emergency phase of 1984, MSF set up the first health committees Mali. In fact, we transformed the food-for-work and nutrition committees into committees around the health centres, each covering a catchment population. The committee was supposed to be involved in the management of the stock of medicines and ensure the proper use of the means available at the health centre-level. It was composed of members of the community.

Community participation was an opportunity created by the extremely precarious situation in which the population was. Food-for-work was addressed to communities and was thought of as compensation against work for the common interest. This approach enabled us to achieve the rapid distribution of a large quantity of food to the final recipients. The flexibility of an organization like MSF has probably improved the efficiency of the system, but at the same time, public structures were partially bypassed. This caused frictions but the inclusion of district chiefs and village health workers in the health committees helped us avoid problems. The involvement of the whole community, including the medical staffs and authorities, in the project allowed everyone to save face.

How did the health store strategy work? How was the idea received by the population?

This system quickly proved efficient in terms of drug supply. The pyramid –one store per region, and then stores at the lower level (the “cercle”) that cater for health centres– was effective, and so was the procurement system that was flexible and required only limited consultation with some suppliers known for their reliability. Through the new system, out of stocks stopped.

On the ground, there was no visible problem with the acceptance of health stores and this especially because of the situation; who would dare to question a program that caters effectively for an entire area in an adverse socio-economic context? Conversely, it is difficult to say whether all the actors really supported the concept. It is likely that the administration of Public Health was divided on the issue: on the one hand because it disavowed the existing system and on the other hand because of the too important place of MSF in the implementation and management.

Obviously, the speed of implementation and the effectiveness of the system aroused the curiosity of other donors and international organizations. Given the situation, the involvement of the population was -among others- opportunistic, but it fit perfectly with the concept of Primary Health Care advocated at the Alma-Ata conference.

Later on, the Bamako Initiative was inspired largely on the "success story" of health stores. Its founders believed that with this strategy, health for all by the year 2000 was at hand. However, we were quickly disillusioned. At the time of the Bamako Initiative, the health stores had not gone through their “sickness of youth” and it was unclear whether the concept as such, partly based on community participation, was actually viable in the medium and long run.

Based on your experience, do you feel that community participation was ‘spontaneous’?

In times of scarcity and famine, when everybody first works for their own survival and the survival of their relatives, community participation could never be spontaneous. Similarly, in a less dire situation but still marked by relative poverty, community participation without an immediate benefit for oneself or one’s family seems illusory.

Community participation had been requested to facilitate the delivery of aid and then organize the management of health activities. I think this participation was neither entirely spontaneous nor completely imposed. It was naturally organized around the revitalization of health facilities. With food-for-work, nutritional rehabilitation, and the supply of drugs, the benefits of participation were immediate and visible.

Let's talk about your experience in Chad. What were the differences with Mali?

MSF had already begun the supply of essential drugs to Chad during the civil war in the 1980s’. Our activities were gradually extended over a large part of the territory until the mid- 90s’ (I left Chad in 1995); there was a very serious shortage of skilled medical staff. Driven by the circumstances, MSF became a major player in the health pyramid, and was completely integrated to it.

The establishment of community participation in the prefecture of Mayo-Kebbi in 1989 took place in the context of a larger project of revitalization of the entire health system that included the rehabilitation and extension of infrastructures, the revitalization of district hospitals, and support in medical supplies and staff training. From the outset, community participation was oriented towards the active participation of the population in the management of health centres. This management was mainly about the revenues generated through curative consultations in order to cover the cost of medicines.

Revenue management was provided by a person designated by the health committee. This system was encouraged and supervised by the head doctor. The remoteness and lack of competence in the field did not allow for other alternative for the management of relatively large amounts of money; direct management by the medical staff was not a credible alternative. Revenue management remained risky because there often was no way to deposit money outside the health facility.

In an interview on this blog, Agostino Paganini declared that the Bamako Initiative died long ago. What is your take on that?

It is impossible for me to know what our projects have become, especially against the background of the tragic circumstances the region is going through. However, it seems that community participation as conceived in this time is fragile and transient. The heavy investment that is needed for community mobilization and voluntary participation to the committees is hard to sustain and inevitably leads to the depletion of the initial enthusiasm. The “bureaucratization” of some positions in the committees, such as treasurer or manager, often announces the beginning of a general decline in community participation.

In situations I have experienced in countries facing socio-economic and / or political stability and security issues, participation is not spontaneous and does not originate in local initiatives. It is rather part of intervention and support strategies, it is genuine good intention but it is not necessarily in phase with the problems of the target population.

Community participation, as long as community mobilization is supported and regular, can be an interesting vantage point to address populations’ need and take action. Yet, the survival of such initiative is directly related to the duration of the projects/interventions.

Jean-Benoît Falisse

We continue our exploration of community participation in Africa, 25 years after the Bamako Initiative. Dr. Frederick Golooba-Mutebi is a political scientist and Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester and Research Associate of the Africa Power and Politics Programme at the Overseas Development Institute in London. He has widely published on health, local government and other topics, with a concentration on Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan and South Africa.

Jean-Benoît Falisse: You have been working on issues of community participation for quite a few years now. What sparked off your interest for this topic?

Fred Golooba-Mutebi: My interest stemmed from the knowledge I had of how the society I was born in works. I had grown up in it and knew roughly how people felt and thought about different things. A key aspect of participation is that it presumes that communities, wherever they are found, always want to assert themselves over their leaders or people in positions of power and authority. My own society is very hierarchical in orientation. People generally treat leaders with deference. And even if one does not respect a leader or has an issue against him or her, they are more likely to avoid than confront them. The idea of participation with people holding their leaders to account is therefore a difficult proposition. Traditionally local leaders did not account directly to the community. They accounted to their superiors, the senior chiefs, and ultimately to the king. In distant (pre-colonial) times, before the region I was born in became more populated, people could easily move house from one area to another one. The possibility of shifting enabled them to vacate areas presided over by leaders they did not like to those with leaders who had a reputation for being good. The consequences for a leader whose people “voted with their feet” included being deposed by the king. In short, my knowledge of my own society conflicted with the theory of popular participation. That triggered an interest in me to go and investigate the extent to which it was feasible. I found that it really is not. Like it or not, traditions and ways of seeing or doing things live very long.

Community participation was a key principle of the Bamako Initiative. Today is seems the Bamako Initiative hasn't quite reached its objectives. What do you think are the main reasons?

There are several reasons. One is that service delivery in health care fails because of factors that go way beyond what participation can address or rectify such as the availability of medicines and human resources in rural areas and the professional supervision necessary for delivering care according to established standards. The idea of wanting to ‘capture’ for the public sector money people were spending on private provision was a good one. However, its weakness lay in assuming that people would be as willing to pay for care in government facilities as they were in private ones. Experience in Uganda has shown that it certainly wasn’t the case. For many poor people, paying for care in government facilities alongside paying taxes was a contradiction in terms. “Why pay taxes and then pay for services as well?’ People knew that owners of private facilities were ‘doing business’ and therefore had to make a profit but the idea that government facilities should do the same clashed with many people’s understanding of what governments are supposed to do, which is provide free health care services. Rather than pay for inferior public services, people naturally preferred the higher-quality and more responsive private provision. The proliferation of private facilities of all sorts made the ‘exit’ from public provision fairly easy. Private providers in the highly unregulated health markets of poor countries are more than happy to provide their clients with the services they want, not necessarily those they need. In the 1990s, Susan Reynolds Whyte found that people in rural Uganda could turn up at drug shops and ask for whatever medicines they wanted in proportions they themselves had determined, in line with the amount of money they had. The Bamako Initiative therefore fell short of its aspirations because it was founded on plausible but questionable presumptions.

Why did community participation propositions such as the Bamako Initiative appear in the late 80s’? Could/should they have been designed differently?

The initiatives appeared at the time they did because there was a desperate need for change. Public provision of health services in much of the developing world was abysmal. There was need for radical thinking, to devise ways of bringing about improvement. Yes, they could have been designed differently. The key problem, as far as I can figure it out, was the one-size-fits-all approach, whereby development initiatives are introduced in every country in exactly the same way, without regard to contextual considerations. Clearly countries are different and cannot possibly follow the same path in the pre-determined ways the development industry promotes. There is something to be said for each country trying to do what fits its context rather than going for so-called ‘best practice’. If countries such as Rwanda have been more successful than others in reforming their health systems in ways that have proved to work for them, it is because, as research by the Africa Power and Politics Programme at the Overseas Development Institute discovered, they went for “good fit” rather than ‘best practice’ solutions. They provide us with the grounds for questioning the tendency within the development industry to promote universalist solutions to problems of development or governance.

You have been a critical voice of community participation and incidentally you come from Uganda - unlike quite a few prominent researchers on community participation who come from North America/Western Europe. Do you think there is a (Western) "doxa" of community participation? Was it mostly a donor fad?

As I indicated at the beginning, my skepticism about participation stemmed from my understanding of how the community I was born in and grew up in functioned, and how things such as leadership were understood. It never derived from theorizing about what is good for poor communities. The trouble with the development industry is that it is dominated by theorists whose understanding of the world or worlds they want to change or improved is limited and informed by short visits and to a large extent superficial interactions with the people whose lives they want to improve. It seems to me as if the problem really is the naïve liberalism of well meaning but misguided outsiders working with insiders who are too willing to play along without asking some hard questions. In my opinion the Rwandans get a lot right by refusing to be dragged along, by questioning and rejecting things they believe will not work for them and going for what works.

Do you think it would make sense to consider using similar mechanisms of community participation in North America/Western Europe?

I don’t think so. For one thing, participatory mechanisms demand lots of people’s time. You cannot expect people in a community to hold all these meetings and make all the decisions; what time would they have left for ‘living’? I have lived in Europe. I never sat in a single community meeting and if anyone had required me to attend as many meetings as my mother in the village in Uganda is required, I would never have had the time to do so. My mother attends very few meetings and misses most for the same reasons. Things in the areas of London where I lived, worked the way they did because the UK has a functioning state. That is what we need in Africa and the developing world, not participation. This is not to say that participation has no value; it does. It can complement a strong, functioning state when people could rise up and express dissatisfaction whenever they may judge it necessary. And in that case, it can only be sustained in a context where the state is responsive. Otherwise people will see no reason to engage in citizen action that produces no results.

If I understand correctly, community participation in social services in Uganda was also quite heavily promoted by the state. What do you think is
the reason? Wasn't it in a sense weakening the state a bit more?

As a fashion in development, participation coincided with the rise to power of the National Resistance Movement (NRM). The NRM leadership had tested the benefits of citizens participating in decision making during the civil war when they organized citizens into local councils in order to enable them to take charge of things such as security and also to vet recruits into the rebel army. The arrangements worked well enough for the Movement to want to apply them to post-war governance once they seized power, not least because they offered a window of opportunity for the state to penetrate the entire countryside, undermine traditional authority structures and entrench itself. Further, the NRM’s rise to power coincided with the early post-cold-war period when democratization and accompanying phenomena such as decentralization were top on the agenda of the donor community. In this sense there was a coincidence of interests between the NRM leadership and the donor community. Two decades down the road, we know that there was a great deal of naivety in assuming that ordinary people actively wanted and were capable of watching over their leaders and questioning as well as directing their activities. I do not think participation weakened the state. Rather, it did nothing to strength states that were already weak. It allowed governments to shirk their responsibility for making things work and to load it onto citizens who possessed neither the inclination nor the capacity for doing so.

In a recent article, you argue that "vertical and horizontal co-ordination, inspection and supervision, and the strength of accountability enforcement mechanisms" are the keys for efficient social services delivery. What is exactly the role of communities there? What is the future of community participation in social services delivery?

Yes, indeed, those are the keys in my opinion. Communities ought to be accorded avenues through which they can pressurize their leaders if they judge that to be the thing to do at any one moment. This could happen if, say, they find the quality of service provision is below their expectations. For this to happen, educational campaigns should be mounted to ensure they know it is their right to do so. This is more or less the situation in Western democracies. People are not required – and I mean required – to participate in decision making on the scale those in poor countries are. However, when leaders make decisions they find objectionable, they have the right to demonstrate or engage in forms of citizen action that put their message or messages across to whoever they are intended for. Even then, we should not expect this change to happen overnight. The kind of activism we see in advanced democracies took root over long periods of time.

It seems to me that popular participation is rarely considered as a political act. From your research and experience, would you say that popular participation is a political act?

Well, if we agree that participation is intended to influence decision making and in a sense even resource allocation, then it is about making a choice between or among competing ideas. It is therefore a political act. That in a sense is also a reason why it is a difficult proposition in contexts where relations between leaders and the people they lead are highly hierarchical and don’t entail direct confrontation or contestation.

Bruno Meessen


In this blog post, Bruno Meessen (ITM, Antwerp) revisits the gaps in the implementation of fee exemption policies in numerous African countries. He attempts to draw useful lessons for the universal health coverage agenda, for African governments, the international community and researchers. 


In 2009, at the request of UNICEF, I was fortunate to be able to coordinate a study on fee exemption policies in 6 African countries. The results were published in a supplement of Health Policy & Planning, alongside other articles on the same topic. Our multi-country study had relatively modest ambitions: we were not trying to document the impact of these policies, but rather try to understand to what extent their formulation and implementation were based on good public policy practices. Overall, our evaluation was not very positive. While the study confirmed the good intentions of country leaders to take strong measure to reduce financial barriers, it highlighted the precipitous manner in which such measures were put in place without adequate preparation (in terms of time, financing, accompanying measures, and technical expertise) for national technicians to ensure that these policies were well conceived and well implemented. We expressed concern about the consequences these weaknesses would have on the policies’ efficacy and sustainability.

This study had at least one tangible effect: it made it clear that a lot of work remained to be done in terms of sharing and spreading knowledge regarding the implementation of health financing policies. At the dissemination meeting for the study in New York, the idea for creating a community of practice around fee exemption policies was launched. In due time, the Financial Access to Health Services CoP was launched. You are likely already familiar with its work if you follow this blog.

Implementation of fee exemption policies: what we know in 2013

The topic of formulating and implementing fee exemption policies has been relatively intensely researched in the past few years. This is not only the case for the FAHS CoP as a group (note the Bamako CoP workshop in 2011, but also a forthcoming conference in Ouagadougou in November 2013), but also for several teams of researchers.  Let me specifically mention recent studies by Valéry Ridde (University of Montréal) and Sophie Witter (University of Aberdeen), two prolific authors whose work also contributed to the multi-country study.

In a very recent edition of Afrique Contemporaine (in French), the results of a mixed method research led by Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan and Valéry Ridde were published. The supplement reports on the different observations made by research teams, notably LASDEL, on fee exemption policies in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Several noteworthy articles include one on the perceptions of various actors in Mali, a mapping of fee exemption policies in West Africa (showing that all countries have them), and a study from Niger investigating the problem of decapitalization in health centers.

The introductory synthesis is entitled “Fee exemptions in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger: public policy contradictions.” This title reflects the overall tone of the supplement. Here is an excerpt.

Fee exemptions are decisions taken at a national level, defended as sovereign, and implemented by national technicians without any particular external assistance, something rather rare in the history of health policy. But these reforms have been made hastily. The decision has been political rather than technical, announced suddenly and publically, taking not only field technicians but also those in the Ministry completely by surprise. 
                                                                                                                                               (Olivier de Sardan & Ridde 2012 - our translation)

A few months earlier, Valéry Ridde, Ludovic Queuille and Yamba Kafando had just finished the final report of their project, “Capitalizing fee exemption policies for health services in West Africa.” This project is worth mentioning for several reasons: beyond the knowledge that it generated, it had the merit of being based on country experts (Ministry of Health professionals, researchers, and NGO experts involved in fee exemption programs). The transversal study centered on 7 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sénégal et Togo ). It also focused on implementation. 

The book’s tone is more positive than the supplement cited above. The synthesis chapter, which is also available in English, identifies for six of the countries studied, the major problems encountered during implementation but also the innovations. An excerpt:

"While the principles underlying these policies appear to be well appreciated, health workers did not hide their dissatisfaction regarding the policies’ implementation. In Burkina Faso, they complained of a lack of medical and technical supplies, while in Senegal and Niger the complaints were regarding significant delays in reimbursement of free services provided to patients. Finally, in most cases, workers were calling for financial bonuses to compensate for increases in their clinical or administrative activities resulting from user fees exemption policies. These financial aspects of bonuses for health workers were not taken into account in any of the policies."
                                                                                                             (Ridde et al. 2012)

Elsewhere in 2012, Sophie Witter published a study on the fee exemption policy for Caesarean sections and for children under five years old in Sudan, a country little documented in international health. Her study once again highlights major weaknesses in implementation.

"The fee exemption policy for Caesarean sections and for children under five years old, launched in 2008, clearly suffered from a number of constraints that led to uneven and often poor implementation. Notable among these constraints is a lack of adequate financing and clear implementation guidelines."   
                                                                                                                                                                                                      (Witter et al 2012)

Let me make four comments before giving my own read of the situation. First, one can observe that the general tone of these studies on fee exemptions remains relatively positive. Neither the authors of these studies nor I intend to discredit these national policies. Second, these studies show that there is a certain heterogeneity in countries’ experiences: countries that have had better implementation than others have shown some good results. Third, when one identifies weaknesses in either formulation or implementation, one should not write those policies off entirely. We know that certain policies that have begun badly have later been reformed to better reach the most vulnerable. The example of Burundi – which combined its fee exemptions with its performance-based financing program– is the best known case. Fourth, it appears that countries having launched their fee exemption programs later have been able to benefit from recommendations to better prepare for the policy. This is certainly the case of Sierra Leone, even though challenges remain. 

All of that said, here we are all the same with a sample of 11 documented country experiences telling the same story: fee exemption policies in Africa over the last 10 years have been public policies launched on presidential initiative, using national resources, but formulated in haste without adequately and rigorously taking into account technical and operational considerations. Those that are under-financed are nonetheless in danger. 

 What has changed at the country level

It is important to note that these policies have marked renewed initiative among African presidents and governments to re-engage in the health sector. In a number of countries, other than health personnel salaries, the State had basically been absent in the health sector for two decades; cost recovery, the rise of the private health sector, and international assistance having left the impression that health financing could manage without public funding (well, it is also true that, to put it bluntly, State coffers were empty).

Today we are coming full circle: user fees – which will likely continue to play a role despite wide criticism – have shown their limitations; the rise of the private health sector in many countries has been poorly regulated by the State, and the global financial crisis in wealthy countries hardly paints a hopeful picture for international assistance.  But more fundamentally, economic growth is creating new financing possibilities within public budgets across the continent.  

We must, however, ensure that this re-engagement by national leaders happens in the most productive way possible, with budgets matching not only declarations, but technical rigor and long-term vision. It should be possible to build on the pledges made jointly by health and finance Ministers in Tunis in July 2012. We can also make the most of the international interest and support for Universal Health Coverage. But to build the future, we must not forget lessons from recent experience. 

Two reflections for the political agenda for UHC

A first lesson is for the ears of political leaders (if they read us!): remember that haste is a resource to use with caution when it comes to health financing. Leadership and boosts in momentum are welcome, but should not compromise the initiative itself, nor all of the health system strengthening efforts that have preceded it. UHC won’t be built on a few announcements, but through perseverance.

The lack of dialogue that accompanies political precipitation breeds unnecessary antagonism. It would be a shame for those who work tirelessly to strengthen health systems – whether they are frontline workers, implementers at the regional or national level or advisors – to become a force of opposition to UHC. The lively debate within the PBF CoP after the UN General Assembly’s resolution on UHC reflect this reality.  

There is also a lesson there for international actors advocating for UHC. It is perhaps the time to re-evaluate the relative effort you are putting into advocacy versus actual technical assistance.  Our impression is that advocacy predominates when it comes to UHC: while Twitter is buzzing, people are mobilizing in Beijing, and at the UN they are promoting UHC, the aid community is providing precious little support to UHC on the ground. We should thus not be surprised as presidents are getting on the bandwagon and the political machine is activated that they “put the cart before the horse.”

Focusing exclusively on advocacy for UHC makes sense maybe for middle-income countries – they have the financial resources and technical capacity in line with such ambitions. But in poor countries, advocacy alone is problematic. And yet it is virtually impossible to compartmentalize the world when it comes to advocacy, messages pass far and wide. 

You get my point: we are arguing for an approach with a much more context specific analysis of the challenges many African countries are facing, especially those where governance is still being strengthened. We are not, however, advocating for some super-agency for UHC; that model is outdated. We are convinced that appropriate assistance should be based on a more collaborative model that builds on the growing expertise present on the continent, such as HHA has promoted and is being implemented through communities of practice. We would be happy to see more collaboration and support, especially from the UHC flag-bearing institutions.

Ideas for researchers

Our third point addresses researchers. Thanks to your hard work, we know much more about the last ten years’ experience with fee exemptions in Africa. Of course, many questions remain, but it seems fair to say that at least in terms of retrospective studies on the formulation and implementation of country fee exemption policies, we are reaching a data saturation point. 

For some observers, these fee exemption policies are just a step on the path toward UHC. Shouldn’t that point to another research topic: how have these policies evolved and are they in-line with UHC objectives; are they actually an effective starting point on the road to UHC?  

I see at least two possible directions.

It would be interesting to pull together knowledge on the policy process, especially on the dialogue between the political and technical levels. Are they eventually able to transcend their initial lack of dialogue? Have presidents drawn lessons about the importance of this dialogue? Or on the contrary, are the same errors being repeated? If the same problems persist, what are the determinants of such political haste? What options exist for actors wishing to improve these processes? What are the lessons for the next phases toward UHC?  

We can also identify the stakes when it comes to policy design. Researchers really need to help us all reflect on how these fee exemption initiatives – often multiple in the same country - relate to other financing schemes to form a coherent strategy that provides health coverage to all. In many countries, there is a complex mix of coverage schemes: public financing (traditional or PBF), health insurance for civil servants, mutuelles for those in the informal sector, and various fee exemptions for different population groups, age ranges, health problems, and even treatment regimen! For reasons of efficiency, equity, not to mention limited available resources, it becomes critical to better harmonize health financing schemes. We could begin by documenting the situation at the country level and by identifying some potential solutions.  Can any of you help countries in this way? It will certainly be a top priority for the CoPs in 2013.

Translation: Allison Kelley

There was a large participation at the Marrakesh workshop of the Financial Access Community of Practice – including several experts from Asia.  Philip Akanzinge from Ghana was curious to know why Kikuchi Taro, from Japan, came to the meeting.


PA: Mr Kikuchi, can you introduce yourself?

KT: I work at JICA, the bilateral aid agency of Japan. I am Deputy Director in the Health Division of the Tokyo office. I am responsible for Health Systems Strengthening, with a strategic focus on Health Care Financing issues for Africa.

Can you tell us how you got to know about this workshop?

Let me just start with the history of the involvement of JICA in Harmonization for Health in Africa (HHA) . JICA announced its participation in HHA two years ago. Our presence here is a testimony of our commitment to be heavily involved in the promulgation of HHA CoPs. Compared to other CoPs including Human Resource for Health where we have been very active, in the issue of health care financing we are rather new. So far, we have not had many chances to be part of  activities for that area.

I understand that you are curious to know more on JICA. Myself, I am an officer in charge of overseeing the HHA mechanism on behalf of JICA in the Tokyo office. We have two focal points in Africa supporting HHA work; one is at our office in Nairobi and the other is working at Dakar office. I was informed about this workshop by my colleague in the Nairobi office.

When it comes to health care ealth financing, I repeat that JICA is something like a new comer. JICA is still exploring into its untapped dimensions of Health Systems Support  such as health care financing, out of which assistance in health insurance is promising. JICA sees this workshop as an opportunity to take this technical issue seriously, observe the discussions so that I can go back to report.

Let me say that this workshop is very timely for JICA as Japan celebrated 50 years’ anniversary of achieved Universal Health Coverage (UHC) last year. Hearing that Africa is now intensively talking about UHC, JICA is willing to know more on what is actually going on in Africa and how the debate is going, and to see if there are some areas JICA will be able to support.  Health care financing is broad and has many aspects. At this stage, I can already tell you that JICA is interested in planning assistance in the areas of National Health Insurance and National Health Account. Health Insurance is seen as a key intervention to ensure the equitable access to health by covering most of the indigents. National Health Account is also recognized of great help in terms of reading domestic and external financial flows for strengthening the health insurance mechanism. Both of them, we believe that, are potentially significant in leading to the UHC.

The workshop has not yet ended but what is you observation so far?

So far the programme is going very well. I have seen very high senior technical officer from National and International Organizations represented in the meeting. The presentations and contributions are of high technical quality. I have also seen active sharing of ideas. I have observed that health insurance is more advanced than I expected in some of the Africa countries as well as commitment is confirmed to work  towards the UHC. This is promising.