# Mixed Provider Payment System in Morocco Challenges of alignment (work in progress)

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# Morocco: What is in the mix?

### **Purchasers**

Ministry of Health Ministry of Finance Medical Assistance Regime (RAMED) National Health Insurance (NHIs)

Private Health Insurance


### **Payment methods**

Line Item budgets Budget allocation National conventions (combining Case-Based Payment + Fee-For-Service) Case-based (PPP) Cost sharing (OOPs)

### Providers


Primary Health Centres (ESSB) District Hospitals (SEGMA) Teaching / University Hospitals (CHU) Private practices (GPs and Specialists) Private Clinics






## **Breakdown of Total Health Expenditure (THE)**

NHA 2014 Source: http://apps.who.int/nha/database/ViewData/Indicators/en



GGHE = 6.03 % of GGHE




# Analysis












Incentives and effects of MMPS Provider perspective – public sector

# Health centres and District / Provincial hospitals


- Mostly line-item budget allocations
- Low autonomy and under-funding
- No incentive for hospitals to bill for SHI nor for RAMED, as this would affect budget allocations
- Incentives of line-item budget coupled with lack of autonomy dominate
- = > Under-provision (= low activity)





## Incentives and effects of MMPS Provider perspective – public sector **Autonomous University Hospitals**





- Budget allocation and FFS and case payment from SHI/PHI
- Active billing for the SHI patients, virtual billing for documentation for RAMED patients

=> Higher activity

Difference in payment rates of tarification between Ramedists, SHI members, and PHI clients makes the latter two groups more attractice

=> Cream-skimming (?), with potential inequitable access

Incentives and effects of MMPS Provider perspective – Private sector


### **Private Providers**

- Mostly paid per activity (cased-based + FFS)
  - In certain instances, combination of FFS and case payment is possible
- Lack of control of billing practice
  > Over-provision

=> Cost-shifting, over-billing
=> Inefficiencies, cost increase

### Evidence:

 92% of the SHI expenditure flows to the private sector







# System perspective Effects at the system level



Current MPPS provides:

- More activity oriented incentives for private providers and tertiary hospitals
- More cost-containment incentives for public, primary health care providers
- ⇒ Imbalance in financial flows: private sector is more attractive for both patient and health staff
- $\Rightarrow$  Contributes to the growth of the private sector
- $\Rightarrow$  Health workers shift to the private sector
- Reinforces the segmentation of the health system and hospital-centrism
- Issues also rooted in the overall fragmented health financing architecture, as well as in governance issues
- How can the differences in supplies, human resources and (perceived) quality be reduced between the public and private sector?

## **Options: how to align the MPPS for coherent incentives?**

- Do we need to add new payment methods? If so with what sequence?
- Difficult task which requires intensive work
  - Illustration of the new PPP agreement
- Will reforming the existing mix suffice? If so in what sense?

No magic bullet



## **Options: how to align the MPPS for coherent incentives?**

- Harmonise payment methods
  - Provider payment for RAMED patients should be similar to that of patients affiliated to CNOPS, or with a specific budget with explicit funding
  - Reduce tariff differences in the national conventions between RAMED, SHI and VHI
- Introduce a P4P in the public sector

### Accompanying governance related measures

- Provide effective financial autonomy to District/Provincial Hospitals

   to enable them to respond to output oriented payment methods
- Introduce cost-containment measure and quality control for private sector; more rigorous review of claims + strengthen the accreditation process


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
(more to come soon)





# System perspective Effects at the system level


- There is no P4P:
  - Would P4P be a useful component of the payment system in the public sector?











Line Item Budget

